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Abstract
With the development of mobile internet, protecting location privacy has already been an important issue. Based on
previous studies and the drawback of traditional algorithms, the paper proposes a novel algorithm for protecting
location privacy. The algorithm is based on the voronoi map of a road network, considers the problem of side-weight
inference, and utilizes the information entropy as metrics. Meanwhile, the algorithm can defense the attack of
side-weight inference and replay. Lastly, we verified the algorithm based on the real data of the road network. Results
of experiences show that the improved algorithm has the better performance on some key performance metrics.
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1 Introduction
With the rapid development of mobile network, the leak-
age of location privacy has become a problem that cannot
be ignored. So lots of researchers have paid more atten-
tion on it. So far, researches on protecting location privacy
mainly focus on two aspects: The infrastructure of a
location privacy protection system and themethod of pro-
tecting location privacy. Now, the mainstream architec-
tures of a location privacy protection system are usually
divided into three categories: non-cooperative architec-
ture, distributed peer-to-peer architecture, and central-
ized architecture [1].
The existing methods about location privacy protection
mainly include false-name location privacy protection,
landmark location privacy protection, false-address loca-
tion privacy protection, and spatial anonymity location
privacy protection. False-name location privacy protec-
tion replaces the real identity of a user by a false name
so that attackers cannot obtain the real query source
from location-based services (LBS) severs [2]. Landmark
location privacy protection only utilizes some landmark
position within a certain range instead of a user’s real posi-
tion to interact with LBS, so attackers cannot identify the
real position of users [3]. Through the further research
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on landmark method, the current method of protecting
location privacy based on a landmark not only uses land-
mark position to replace the real position of a target, but
also utilizes some algorithms to give a false position to
replace the real position of users. For instance, literature
[4] adopts an incremental nearest neighbor query algo-
rithm to realize location privacy protection. In literature
[5], an anonymous regional transformation algorithm is
adopted. In the method of false-address location privacy
protection, a position information set, that includes the
real position of a user and a sequence of a false posi-
tion (dubbed as dummy), is sent to LBS, so attackers have
no way to distinguish the real position information from
the received information [6,7]. Spatial-anonymity loca-
tion privacy protection is also a very interesting method.
An anonymous server makes user information anony-
mous to obtain a fuzzy space or user set and then
uses the fuzzy space or user set as a requester body to
interact with an LBS server. So far, K-Anonymous algo-
rithm proposed by Marco Gruteser is the most classic in
spatial-anonymity location privacy protection [8]. Based
on K-Anonymous algorithm, some scholars propose sev-
eral improved algorithms aimed at different performance
demands. For instance, literature [9,10] propose person-
alized K-Anonymous algorithm based on personalized
demands of users. The algorithm can adjust the requested
k value for users according to their security demand.
To solve the problem of a low anonymous success rate
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of a traditional algorithm, Xiao et al. designed an effi-
cient directed graph based on choking algorithms [11].
The Casper algorithm in [12] mainly considers a large-
scale requested condition and personalized anonymous
demand.
However, the current researches mostly focus on
Euclidean geometric space. In fact, a road network envi-
ronment limits the user’s activity in most cases. Mean-
while, it is very meaningful to make further research on
location privacy protection based on the road network.
In [13], Rubner gives a method that transforms Euclidean
geometric space into the road network environment. Lit-
erature [14] gives an X-STAR algorithm. The algorithm
regards road crossing point as a node and conducts an
anonymous process to users. It can simultaneously make
an anonymous set satisfy two conditions, k-anonymous
of location and l-diversity of road. According to the road
network environment, an anonymous ring, anonymous
tree, or anonymous cellular can also be adopted to real-
ize location privacy protection [15,16]. In addition, Zhao
et al. give an anonymous method based on a voronoi map.
The anonymous method can be fulfilled in a v zone after
satisfying the condition of K-Anonymous and l-diversity.
The above algorithms have their own advantages, but their
shortcomings are also obvious. For example, the algorithm
in [13] has too low security. The anonymous success rate
in [14] is too low, and its computation complexity is too
high. In [15], a too large anonymous ring may result in the
serious degradation of QOS. Algorithms in [16,17] do not
consider the attack of side-weight inference, so their secu-
rity is not enough. Therefore, in this paper, we consider
the problem of side-weight inference and utilize the infor-
mation entropy asmetrics, then propose a novel algorithm
based on voronoi-weight (V-W) for protecting location
privacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We analyze the related issues of a traditional algorithm
and determine the design target of our algorithm in
Section 2. The complete design is given in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the performance evaluation result of
our proposed algorithm. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 5.
2 Problem proposed
2.1 The comparison of algorithms
As far as we are concerned, due to a simple architec-
ture, centralized architecture is the most popular. In this
architecture, the interaction between mobile terminal and
anonymous severs is encrypted to guarantee the security
of user requests. The data interaction between anony-
mous severs and an LBS server adopts plaintext transmis-
sion to save system resource.
In this paper, we mainly consider the shortcoming of
traditional anonymous ring algorithms and anonymous
cellular algorithms and improve the existing location pri-
vacy algorithm based on the road network. The advan-
tages of an anonymous ring algorithm is that an attacker
starts searching from any path by using the anonymous
ring algorithm; the final output of the anonymous ring
or anonymous tree are the same. So the algorithm has
good anti-replay attack capability. However, the anony-
mous ring algorithm only considers if there are mobile
users at two sides of a ring and ignores the distributed
probability of users. If the user’s distribution of each
side is not the same, the user is easily attacked by side-
weight inference. In addition, if the ring or road is too
long, the output of anonymous road sets would cover a
too large region and result in a too heavy computational
burden.
Different from the anonymous ring algorithm, anony-
mous cellular algorithm does not seek an anonymous ring
as an anonymous road set and utilize the vertex, which
degree is larger than the default threshold, to construct
an anonymous cellular to guarantee the l-diversity of the
road. The output of the algorithm is the user set that satis-
fies k-anonymous and l-diversity of the road. The method
dividing the road network into anonymous cellular and
not utilizing the whole road largely reduces the coverage
of the anonymous set and system overhead. Simultane-
ously, selecting the right vertex can make an anonymous
area satisfy the l-diversity of road and improve the anony-
mous success rate. The ability of anti-replay attack can
be improved by randomly selecting a user within an adja-
cent road to join the anonymous set. However, because
the cellular adopts round topology, it cannot cover the
whole road network completely. If the user is located in
the area where cellular does not cover, its position would
be leaked, such as U6 in Figure 1. And the cellular usually
selects the half length of the longest road as radius, so it
would produce lots of overlap regions and reduce anony-
mous efficiency. For instance, U18 and U21 belong to two
cellulars simultaneously, so cellular selecting is a prerequi-
site to an anonymous process. Additionally, the algorithm
has no restraint for a path where the user in the anony-
mous set lies, so it is easy to be attacked by side-weight
inference. For instance, in the n12-centered cellular, if U14
requests location services with the l-diversity demand of
a road section (l = 2), the user in the anonymous set
may come from the n12 n13 road section or n12 n15 road
section. Because of the probability that the user lies in n12
n13 is higher than that in n12 n15, an attack may infer-
ence the real position of the user and result in user privacy
leakage.
In general, aimed at the drawback of traditional algo-
rithm, we summarize the following problem:
1) Assuming that an attacker already intercepted
anonymous servers’ requested information from an
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Figure 1 The model of anonymous cellular network. Select the vertex whose degree is larger than the default threshold as center point and
select the half length of the longest road as radius to draw a circle. All of the circles are anonymous cellular zones, and the number of roads is
greater than or equal to the degree of vertex in every zone.
LBS server, how to guarantee that the attacker
cannot obtain the correct location
information?
2) How to guarantee that the server can defense
the replay attack and side-weight inference
attack effectively?
2.2 The design target of algorithm
Based on the above problem, we give a novel location pri-
vacy protection algorithm based on the road network. The
design targets of the algorithm are as follows:
Target 1 The output anonymous set of algorithm
satisfies the k-anonymous demand. Given that
an attacker obtain the requested information
that an anonymous server submitted to an LBS
server, the request does not contain the real
position information of a user but contain the
anonymous road section where the user lies.
Because there are ki mobile users in a set at
least, the probability that the attacker can
identify the position of the user is not higher
than 1/ki, that is k ≥ ki, where k is the number
of users in an anonymous road set, ki denotes as
the number of the user requests.
Target 2 The output anonymous road set satisfies the
l-diversity demand of the road. Assuming that
an attacker intercepts the request and obtains
the anonymous road set. However, the set at
least contains li path, so the probability that the
attacker can identify the correct path of a user
from the set is not higher than 1/li, that is
l ≥ li, where l is the number of roads in the
anonymous road set, and li denotes as the
l-diversity demand of Ui.
Target 3 The algorithm has a good ability to defense the
replay attack.
Target 4 The algorithm has a good ability to defense the
side-weight inference attack.
Replay attack and side-weight inference attack are the
most common attackmethods to location privacy and also
pose the greatest threat on location privacy. Therefore, the
defense abilities against these threats are the main design
target of our algorithm.
Commonly, for a more deep analysis of a replay attack
and side-weight inference attack, we often assume that
an attacker already obtained the request information sub-
mitted by an anonymous server, having the same knowl-
edge of the road network with the anonymous server and
knowing the anonymous algorithm run by the anonymous
server. A replay attack is when an attacker determines
the path where a user lies by a re-run anonymous algo-
rithm. Themethod firstly utilizes anonymous road set S to
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determine all possible roads, S = {e1, e2, · · · , ei, · · · , en},
and respectively assumes the requested user Uk to lie
upon road ei, where i = 1, 2, · · · , n, then utilizes the
anonymous algorithm to process each assumption. Finally,
we can obtain anonymous road set Si and determine the
same road between S and Si by S∩Si. IfN (S ∩ Si) denotes
the number of the same road, the ratio ni can be obtained
by Equation 1.
ni = N(S ∩ Si)N(S) (1)
So, we also derive the replay probability pic that user Uk
lies upon road section ei, that is:
pic = ni
(n1 + n2 + · · · + ni + · · · + nn) (2)
After attackers compute the probability of each assump-
tion, they commonly regard the road with the maximum




ep1c , ep2c , · · · , epnc
}
(3)
As for a side-weight inference attack, the method uti-
lizes the uneven distribution in road to determine the
correct road section where a user lies in. Similarly, we also
assume the attack probability in the same anonymous road
set is equal to 1/k, so the uneven distribution of the user
in each road makes the probability that the attacker suc-
cessfully inferred, also called the probability of side-weight
inference pib, not be 1/l anymore, but the ratio between
the number of user in ith road Wei and the total number
of user in a set, that is:
pib = Wei
(We1 + We2 + · · ·Wei + · · · + Wen)
(4)
3 Algorithm implementation
The V-W algorithm proposed in this paper is based on
centralized architecture. Figure 2 gives the whole work
flow.
Before the user first submits the location service request
to the anonymous server, registration information should
be submitted to the anonymous server; the format is


























Figure 2 The flow of an anonymous request. The users submit the location service request to third party anonymous servers through the IPsec
encryption tunnel. With the operation of V-M algorithm in the anonymous servers, the servers submit the anonymous location service request to LBS.
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Loc(x, y) represents the real user’s location information,
and 0 means that this information is the registered infor-
mation. Another kind of information that the user sub-
mits to the anonymous server represents location update;
the format is [ID, Loc(x, y), 2], where ID represents the
user identity, Loc(x, y) represents the user’s new loca-
tion information, 2 means that this information repre-
sent the location update. The user needs to submit the
information to update the user location information in
the server regularly and thus ensure the quality of user
service.
In Figure 2, to judge whether the user belongs to an
effective anonymous road set, we should consider whether
the set’s time is effective, that is tn − ts > ti, where tn is
the current time, ts is the generation time of an anony-
mous set, and ti is the user’s tolerance time. If the set’s
time is not effective, the V-W anonymous algorithm is
returned. Therefore, it would update the anonymous road
set of the corresponding user and generate the requested
information submitted to LBS. However, if the set’s time
is effective, the request information can be generated
directly by using the anonymous set.
The key step of an anonymous system is the design
of V-W algorithm. The main task of the algorithm
is the three-stage search for an anonymous road set.
The first stage, pre-processing stage, adopts a voronoi
map to divide the road network [17]. The second
stage, that named as road search stage, mainly imple-
ments the search in the output road set of the pre-
processing stage. The third stage is extended search stage.
If the second stage cannot find the targeted road, the
extended search must be implemented in the neighboring
area.
Based on the anonymous cellular algorithm, the sim-
plest way to guarantee the diversity of a road is by
dividing the areas of the road network, which ensures
each area includes l road at least. So the pre-processing
stage must implement area dividing to the road net-
work. In the V-W algorithm, the road network can
be regarded as an undirected graph G(V ,E), which
is also called as a road network map and is com-
bined with line set E = {e1, e2, · · · , en} and node set
V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn}. The voronoi map is also called as
Tyson polygon and adopted in GIS field.
A voronoi map consists of serials of continuous poly-
gons whose edges are the midnormals of consecutive
points on the plane. The center of each voronoi polygon
area is also the endpoints of the perpendicular bisector,
as shown in Figure 3, such as n8 and n1, the edges of the
voronoi polygon area are also the perpendicular bisectors
of the connectors between the center and the consecutive
points. The edges of the voronoi polygon which centers
on n8 are formed by the midnormals of n8 and n1, n2
and n9.
The V-W algorithm adopts the voronoi map to divide
the road network. Hence, it not only ensures each
user to link the corresponding voronoi polygon, but
also reduces the search coverage for finding user Uk
effectively and improves the quality of service. For
convenience of description, we denote V (V ,E) as the
corresponding voronoi map. Combining the real situation
of the road network environment and the user demand






























Figure 3 The voronoi map about a simple roadmodel. The red nodes represent the nodes whose degree must be greater than 3 in the road
network, at least three roads in each voronoi polygon can be guaranteed by the voronoi map which is drawn at the center of these nodes.
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of road diversity, V-W algorithm selects the suited vec-
tor (V ,E), which node metric must be greater than 3
in G(V ,E).
The node metric is defined as the number of road that
crosses through the related node. So each voronoi poly-
gon at least contains three roads. Figure 3 represents the
voronoi map about a simple road model.
In the V-W algorithm, we regard a voronoi polygon
as a v zone. We would implement the search for the
related v zone in the second and third stages. Hence,
in the pre-possessing stage, we need find the corre-
sponding V (V ,E) and map it into the related G(V ,E).
If so, we can determine the road contained in each v
zone and map the user position into the corresponding
G(V ,E) and V (V ,E) while the system receives the user’s
registration information and updated location informa-
tion. In other words, we can locate the user to the
corresponding v zone and the corresponding road. For
instance, in Figure 3, if User U13 requests, the system
can find the v zone where the user lies according to the
user information and find the corresponding road Vi =
{n4n5, n5n12, n12n13, n12n15, n15n16}. After road mapping,
we may adopt a quad-tree way to code the corresponding
v zone in order to search for the neighboring v zone in the
third stage.
After the road dividing and information mapping in the
first stage, we would implement a search for the anony-
mous road set in the corresponding v zone where Uk lies.
In view of too many users in the real situation, we would
adopt a special search method, described in Figure 4. The
search algorithm is as follows:
Step I Locate the v zone where the user lies and sort all
roads in v zone by its own weight. The road
weight we is the number of users in the targeted
road. For example, the result of road sorting in
Figure 4 is as follows:
e1(7) → e4(6) → e5(6) → e2(5) → e6(5)
→ e3(3) → e7(2)































Figure 4 The v zone map. In the V-M algorithm, we regard a voronoi polygon as a v zone. The algorithm takes v zone as search unit. In the v zone
map, the road weight is the number of users in the targeted road.
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Step II Locate the road where the user lies. For instance,
if user U20 requests, the road where the user lies
is e4 and is joined to quasi-anonymous set S′,
S′ = {e4}. Then, select the maximum k and l of
all users in road and assign these values to the
anonymous demand of system, ks and ls. For
convenience of description, let us assume that
the anonymous demand of user U20 is k20 = 10,
l20 = 3 while the anonymous demand of user
U19 is k19 = 12, l19 = 3, so the system should
assign ks and ls, ks = 12, ls = 3.
Step III Select the road randomly from l + ∂ roads
those that are adjacent to the targeted road
to join quasi-anonymous set S′, where l
corresponds to the number of roads which are
adjacent to the road where the user lies in, ∂
corresponds to random factor. Commonly, the
system assigns ∂ as a certain value by default
and guarantees the randomness of the
anonymous road set that the user selected.
Therefore, it can defense the replay attack. For
instance, we randomly select six roads from the
neighboring areas of e4, (e1, e4, e5, e2, e6, e3), to
join S′. Then we modify ks and ls of the system to
the maximum demand of all users in S′, that is
ks = max{ki}, ls = max{li}. When the selected
road e2 is joined to the quasi-anonymous set,
we can obtain S′ = {e4, e2}. Then we need to
compare the ki and li of all users who are in e4
and e2. If only U10 in S′ satisfies li = 4 > ls, the
system would update ls and select a road from
the updated road within ls + ∂ area, ls represents
the number of roads which are adjacent to the
road where the user lies after updated quasi-
anonymous set S′, ∂ corresponds to random
factor. After updated the anonymous demand of
system, system need meet the conditions, nk ≥ ks
and nl ≥ ls where nk is the number of user and
nl is the number of road. If not, system need
select road again from the remaining road within
ls + ∂ . The above process would be repeated until
the conditions, nk ≥ ks and nl ≥ ls, are met. If
the algorithm cannot satisfy nk ≥ ks and nl ≥ ls,
even though the number of the roads of all the
candidates sets an increase, the system would
return the anonymous failure information. In
view of the introduced random value, the
anonymous process has the following three cases:
i) ls + ∂ ≤ nv. Where nv corresponds to
the total number of road in the v zone.
In this case, as the above example
shows, the system may select a road
from ls + ∂ area directly.
ii) ls + ∂ > nv and ls < nv. When the
conditions are met, we may ignore ∂
and randomly select the road to join S′
from all the roads in the v zone. In
other words, we need not extend the
v zone.
iii) ls > nv. When the condition is met, we
need extend the v zone by combining
the neighboring v zone, then repeat the
procession of case i) or ii) according to
the updated ls. In addition, if ks > vk ,
we also need to extend the v zone. vk
corresponds to the total number of
users in the v zone.
Step IV After obtaining the suited anonymous set S′
that satisfies nk ≥ ks and nl ≥ ls, we need to
determine if S′ met the conditions that can
defend the attack of side-weight inference.
The condition is as follows.
max(pib) ≤ δ, i ∈ (1, nl) (5)
where pib is the probability of side-weight inference and
δ is the experience value (here, δ = 0.5), which denotes
the probability threshold of side-weight inference. If the
probability of inference is greater than the threshold, it
represents that the position privacy of the user may be
attacked by side-weight inference.
In Equation 5, the side-weight inference probability of
all roads would be computed. If the probability of all
roads is less than the threshold, the quasi-anonymous
set S′ would be regarded as anonymous set S. If the
situation that a certain probability is greater than the
threshold δ happened, we need to modify the set S′ by
adding a new road from ls + ∂ roads until Equation 5
is satisfied. If all roads in ls + ∂ roads are already
added to the set S′ completely, Equation 5 can still
not be satisfied. We would select the new road from
the v zone until Equation 5 is met. However, when
we run out of all roads in the v zone, Equation 5
still cannot be satisfied, the system would return the
anonymous failure information. For convenience, we may
assume that quasi-anonymous set S′ = {e4, e5, e2, e3} of
user U20 can be obtained by Step III, we have, max(pib) =
p4b < δ. Hence, the system would regard the out-
put S′ as the anonymous set of user U20 and update
all users’ anonymous set to the output S′. The anony-
mous condition of all users within the set would be
satisfied. At the same time, if another user submits a
request within the time tolerance tn − ts ≤ ti, the sys-
tem also regards the set S′ as the anonymous set of the
requester.
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The method can make the system avoid repeated com-
puting for other users within the tolerance time and
reduce the processing time and overhead of the system.
On the other hand, even if an attacker obtains the anony-
mous set, because all users use the same set, it can confuse
the attacker and enhance the ability of an anti-replay
attack of the system.
The third stage of the algorithm needs to realize the
extension of the v zone when case iii) in the second stage is
meet. The system utilizes the linear quad-tree to find the
neighboring v zone of the current v zone. Then, the system
would combine two zones and conduct the search process
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Figure 5 The flow of the V-W algorithm. The V-M algorithm is made up of three stages. The first stage, pre-processing stage, adopts the voronoi
map to divide the road network. The second stage, road search stage, mainly implements the search in the output road set of the pre-processing
stage. The third stage, extended search stage, is if the second stage cannot find the targeted road, the extended search must be implemented in
the neighboring area.
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In the algorithm, the core code about a search step is as
follows:





1: if (Ui ∈ Si&&Si satisfies the anonymous demand of
Ui) then





7: Add ri into S′i; // S′i is quasi-anonymous set
8: Assign ks and ls by ks = max(ki), ls = max(li);
9: Resequence all roads in vi;
10: if (vk < ks&&vl < ls) then
11: if (vl > l + ∂) then
12: Select l + ∂ roads as candidate set;
13: Add road in (l + ∂) area into S′i randomly;
14: else
15: Select all roads in v zone as quasi-set;
16: Add road in quasi-set into S′i randomly;
17: end if
18: Update ks and ls by ks = max(ki), ls = max(li)
19: if (ns > ks&&nl < ls) then
20: if (max(pib) < δ) then




















4 Simulation and analysis
4.1 Experimental environment and data
Table 1 gives the parameter of the environment, as follows:
Table 1 Test platform parameters
Category Parameter
Hardware platform CPU Intel Core T660, main frequency 2.2 GHz
Software platform Eclips
Operation system Windows XP professional
Database Oracle
Coding language Java
We used the PC to imitate the anonymous server to evaluate the performance of
the proposed V-M algorithm.
To obtain the data of the road network, this paper
applies the tools, network-based generator of moving
objects, of Thomas Brinkhoff. We select the part of the
map of Chongqing City of China. The road network is
shown in Figure 6. In this test, we only consider a snapshot
on the database instead of considering the continuous
attack, so the user data within a single time interval is our
concern. Here, we set the number of users within a single
time interval as 10,000, the anonymous demand of a user’s
request is 3 to 15; the diversity demand of the road is 3
to 15.
Figure 7 produced in pre-process stage is the voronoi
map of Chongqing City.
4.2 Simulation result and analysis
4.2.1 The success rate of anonymity
The success rate of anonymity represents the search prob-
ability that an anonymous sever searches the user suc-
cessfully when the user requests a positioning service.
It mainly evaluates the operating efficiency of the sys-
tem. The higher the success rate of anonymity, the better
the system performance. Equation 6 is the representation
of the success rate of anonymity. Where Ns denotes the
number of users whose name are protected successfully.
Nt is the total number of requesters for an anonymous
demand.
Rk = NsNt (6)
Figure 8a shows the change trend of the success rate
with the change of the average demand of k anonymity.
From Figure 8a, we can conclude that the success rate of
anonymity would decline slightly with the increase of the
demand of k anonymity. The reason is that the increase of
k would result in the increase of probability of nobtained ≥
ncandidate, that is, all the candidate roads cannot satisfy the
demand of k anonymity, so the system would output the
failure information. Figure 8b shows the similar change
trend of the success rate of anonymity with the change of
l-diversity of the road. Simultaneously, we also conclude
that the efficiency of the algorithm proposed in this paper
Fan et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2014, 2014:202 Page 10 of 15
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/202
Figure 6 The road network of Chongqing. The road network of the city is comprised of 7,320 nodes and 8,130 sides. The average metric of a road
node is 3.1.
is lower than that of the anonymous ring algorithm and
anonymous cellular algorithm. The reason is that anony-
mous ring algorithm and anonymous cellular algorithm
do not consider the side-weight attack, so some sets that
cannot defend the side-weight attack are also regarded as
the successful cases. Therefore, the algorithm in this paper
achieves the higher security at the cost of the declination
of success rate of anonymity. The proposed V-W algo-
rithm and the other algorithms cannot guarantee a one
hundred percent success rate, so sometimes anonymous
failure is acceptable in practice.
4.2.2 The average time of anonymity
The average time of anonymity is also one of the impor-
tant indexes. It indicates the average time consumed of
one times anonymity. The less the average time, the bet-
ter the system performance. We can obtain the average
anonymous time by Equation 7, where TC denotes the
Figure 7 The corresponding voronoi map of Chongqing City. In this voronoi map, the node with a metric greater than 3 is selected as the
central node of v zone, that is, each v zone at least contains 3 roads.
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Figure 8 The success rate comparison of anonymity. From (a), we can conclude that the success rate of anonymity would decline slightly with
the increase of the demand of k anonymity. (b) The figure shows the similar change trend of the success rate of anonymity with the change of
l-diversity of road.
average time of anonymity, tci is the time consumption of
the ith user’s anonymity, and N corresponds to the total





From Figure 9a, we can see that the time consump-
tion would increase with the increase of k values. If the
demand of k anonymity increases, the system would cost
more time to search. Especially, when the zone cannot sat-
isfy the demand of anonymity, the system needs to extend
the search area. Similarly, we can obtain the same con-
clusion to the l-diversity of the road. Comparing with the
anonymous ring algorithm and anonymous cellular algo-
rithm, the V-W algorithm in this paper has the smaller
time consumption. This is because the average time of
anonymity does not contain the time of pre-process in
this paper. However, the pre-process stage should be a
part of the whole anonymous process. Although the pre-
process will consume a part of the time in practice, the
voronoi map which is generated after the metric is con-
firmed and can be used many times. In other words, if
the voronoi map already exists in practice, the system will
enter into the anonymous search stage without the pre-
process stage. Another reason is that the system need not
compute the anonymous set repeatedly within the time
tolerance and return the existing set when the user in the
same road set requests.
4.2.3 The relative anonymous rate
The relative anonymous rate is also an important norm.
It can be divided into k-relative anonymous rate RALk
and l-relative anonymous rate RALl. RALk represents the
Figure 9 The average anonymous time comparison. From (a), the average anonymous time would increase with the increase of k values. (b)
The figure shows the similar change trend of the average anonymous time with the change of l-diversity of road.
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average value of the ratio between the number of user nik
in the anonymous set and the k-anonymous demand of
the user, as shown in Equation 8. The larger the RALk , the
higher the user’s security. The calculation of RALl is the







In Figure 10a, with the increase of the average demand
of k-anonymity, RALk would decrease; however, the total
number of users in the set would not increase largely. The
result of Figure 10b is similar with that of Figure 10a, so
the result analysis is not repeated again. From Figure 10c,
it gives the change trend of RALk with the change of l.
Because there are so many users in the road, the increase
of l would result in the increase of k drastically, then
cause the increase of RALk . It can provide the better pro-
tection for users. In Figure 10d, when l increases, RALl
would decrease slightly. This is because the algorithm
in this paper need to consider the attack of side-weight
inference. If the requirements of the side-weight inference
cannot meet, the quasi-anonymous set would be enlarged
by adding a road. It would cause RALl larger. However, if
the demand of l-diversity is too large, the requirement of
the side-weight inference would be met. So RALl would
Figure 10 The system relative anonymity comparison. From (a), the RALk would decrease with the increase of k values. From (b), the RALl
would increase with the increase of k values. From (c), the RALk would increase with the increase of l values. From (d), the RALl would decrease with
the increase of l values.
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decrease. In the V-W algorithm, in the same situation,
RALk is greater than the value of the anonymous ring
algorithm and anonymous cellular algorithm. The rea-
son is that k and l selected in this algorithm are the
largest demand in the anonymous set, which causes the
increase of the anonymous rate. Simultaneously, because
the number of roads contained in anonymous ring is usu-
ally greater than the demand of l-diversity, RALl is less
than that of the anonymous ring algorithm in the same
situation.
4.2.4 The average entropy of a replay attack
The average entropy of a replay attack usually represents
the ability of an anti-replay attack and is one of parame-
ters that evaluate the system security. An attacker infers
the probability pic that a user laid into a certain road by
a replay attack, as shown in Equation 2. The available
information entropy Hci usually represents the uncertain
metric of a replay attack. Obviously, the higher the entropy
of replay attack, the larger the uncertain metric that the
attacker infers the location of the user. Hence, our algo-
rithm can provide the stronger ability of an anti-replay





−(pic log pic) (9)
Figure 11 gives the analysis of the average entropy of
a replay attack. From Figure 11a, we can see that the
increase of k has little influence on the average entropy
Hc. Because the replay attack is used to infer the location
of users and k has little influence on the number of roads
in anonymity, so Hc has little increase with the increase of
the value of l. From Figure 11b, we can conclude that Hc
would increase with the increase of l. This is because the
more number of roads would result in the larger uncertain
metric that the attacker infers the location of the users,
that is, the decrease of pic results in the increase of Hc.
Simultaneously, the average entropy Hc of a replay attack
is greater than that of the anonymous ring algorithm and
anonymous cellular algorithm. Because three algorithms
all considered the anti-replay attack, all of them have a
high average entropy. On the other side, we introduce
the candidate extended factor in the V-M algorithm to
increase the ability to an anti-replay attack.
4.2.5 The average entropy of a side-weight inference attack
Side-weight inference is a common attack method. Its
average entropy can represent the defense ability of a
side-weight attack and is also an important parameter to
evaluate the performance of system security. An attacker
may obtain the probability pib at a certain road that a user
lies in by utilizing side-weight inference, so the available
information entropy Hb can represent the uncertain met-
ric that the attacker can infer the correct road where the
user lies. We can obtain Hbi based on Equation 10. Obvi-
ously, the higher the average entropyHb, themore difficult





−(pib log pib) (10)
Figure 12 gives the analysis of the average entropy
of side-weight inference. From Figure 12a, we can see
that the increase of k has little influence on the aver-
age entropy Hb. In this paper, we select the maximum k
and l as anonymous conditions, so the anonymous users
that satisfy the conditions are so many that the variation
of k influence on Hb is little. From Figure 12b, we can
conclude that Hb would increase with the increase of l.
This is because the more the number of roads that an
anonymous user is maybe lying in, the less the inferable
Figure 11 The average information entropy comparison. From (a), the increase of k has little influence on the average entropy Hc . From (b), the
Hc would increase with the increase of l values.
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Figure 12 The average entropy comparison of side-weight attack. From (a), the increase of k has little influence on the average entropy Hb .
From (b), the Hb would increase with the increase of l values.
probability that the user maybe lying in, that is, increas-
ing the denominator of Equation 4 results in the increase
of Hb. Simultaneously, the average entropy Hb of side-
weight inference is larger than that of the anonymous
ring algorithm and cellular algorithm. The reason is that
the anonymous ring algorithm and cellular algorithm do
not consider the uniform distribution of the user in the
road, so it is easy to be attacked by side-weight inference.
However, in this paper, the V-W algorithm regards the
attack probability of side-weight inference as a require-
ment to system in the process of anonymity. So the average
entropy of the V-W algorithm is higher than that of
other algorithms. In other words, we obtain the higher
security of the system by lowering the success rate of
anonymity.
Lastly, based on the above analysis, the algorithm pro-
posed in this paper can meet our design target given in
chapter III. The algorithm not only satisfies the demand
of k-anonymity and l-diversity, but also has the higher the
average entropy of replay attack and side-weight inference.
These provide the better ability on protecting location
privacy for users.
5 Conclusions
This paper firstly introduces the existing method on loca-
tion privacy protection. Secondly, we analyze the draw-
back of traditional algorithms and give the design target of
our algorithm. Lastly, we proposed and analyzed the V-W
algorithm, then compared it with traditional algorithms.
The results can show that our algorithm can provide the
better performance on location privacy protection.
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